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Abstract While Europe has faced trials during the financial
crisis and subsequent austerity, the European continent is still
considered one of the most stable areas on the planet. This
article argues, however, that there are overarching trends in
Europe which, left unaddressed, will reinforce one another to
cause instability. The article applies Arend Lijphart’s theory of
consociational democracy, or elite accommodation, and
Robert Putnam’s theory of the two-level game to European
integration, using these theories as the lenses through which to
view growing roots of instability in the European environ-
ment: demographic decline, immigration, populism, and edu-
cational and labor shortfalls. These trends are analyzed in
terms of their magnitude and persistence as well as their
social, economic, and political impacts on the EU member
states, highlighting the choices the elite must make in order to
successfully navigate those trends and preserve the European
project.
Keywords Trends in Europe . Consociational democracy .
Two-level game .Multi-level governance . Demographic
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Unite or perish
Elites have led the way to increased European integration
since the end of World War II, after which European leaders
sought economic entanglement to avoid another war [1]. The
spread of Communism also posed a threat to their fundamen-
tal Western values, encouraging them to integrate additional
sectors in order to withstand Eastern encroachment [2, 3].
From the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 to
the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, European heads of state put Europe
on the path to increasing unity and solidarity in the face of
external threats from the East, but their actions were also
intended to join a deeply fragmented European society in
order to promote stable democracy [4]. Elites made deliberate
efforts to stabilize Europe through accommodation and con-
sensus, actions that can be described using Arend Lijphart’s
theory of consociational democracy. It is a useful framework
for understanding the beginnings of European integration and
the changes occurring now [5].1
In consociational democracy, political elites pragmatically
govern through power-sharing and consensus-building to
solve “the puzzle of how a divided society could remain
politically stable” [6]. Crucial elements of consociationalism
are that elites have “a minimum of agreement on the funda-
mentals,” a commitment to the preservation and maintenance
of the system, and an ability to bridge the gaps between
subcultures through accommodation [7]. The success of ac-
commodation depends on a deferential attitude of the popu-
lace toward their elites. That is, the elites must be able to
compromise with one another without fearing the loss of their
fellow citizens’ allegiance—and thereby their positions [5, 8].
A committed relationship
European elites have an intellectual and emotional commit-
ment to the idea of “Europe” that is not necessarily mirrored in
their national citizenries. Data gathered by the IntUne Project
1 Consociationalism is a controversial theory in political science, and its
application to the European Union is particularly contested. While ac-
knowledging the criticisms, that it cannot apply to the EU because it was
developed to describe countries with deep social cleavages, etc., I find it
useful nevertheless as a descriptive framework, not a deterministic or
prescriptive model of European supranational or state behavior.
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suggests that “Eurelitism” is “characterized by a stronger
attachment to Europe, a stronger support for the process of
European integration, and a stronger willingness to transfer
substantial elements of national sovereignty to the European
level than is found in the general population” [9]. This data
also indicates that older elites have a stronger commitment to
European integration than do younger ones [9].
The elite commitment to European integration is a self-
reinforcing process. The “Europeanness” of elites is most
strongly correlated with a high level of commitment among
colleagues. According to the analysis conducted by the IntUne
Project, while “Europeanness . . . is only weakly anchored in
their religious affiliations, political belief systems, and their
locus in the social structure [,] [t] he strongest impact . . .
comes from significant others, particularly from cues taken
from fellow elites in other sectors . . .” [9]. Members of the
elite are influenced to be supportive of a united Europe by
other elites who are, in turn, influenced to be even more
supportive, and so on.
Elite commitment to Europe may be conditional, however.
While the peer pressure derived from participation in multi-
level governance structures increases the “Europeanness” of
elites, an interesting finding of the study is that the perception
of the performance of those structures influences elite com-
mitment to them. Trust in European institutions, boosted by
perceptions of good performance, increases positive feelings
toward further integration and transfer of national powers,
such as foreign policy setting, to the EU level [9].
Power to the people
Counting on the deference of their populations, the elites took
many of the steps toward integration without the European
peoples’ awareness of their implications [10]. European pub-
lics were content to part with their national sovereignty in
return for the promised peace and economic prosperity pro-
vided by integration. This led to complacency on both sides
and a perception that the European project was inexorably
headed toward utopia.
Over time, however, as memories of the wars faded and the
existential threat of Communism receded fromEurope, prosperity
was no longer sufficient compensation for deference. The infor-
mal cooperative practices that emphasized consensus decisions
even when majority voting was available, “allowed peace and
prosperity to flourish to such an extent that . . . they ha [d] become
a victim of their own success” [11]. European institutions and the
European populace had by the beginning of the 21st century
evolved to an extent that elite accommodation appeared to be
no longer necessary to maintain stable democracy [11].
In addition, over the past few years, the EU has not been
able to fulfill the promises of prosperity, and as the Europe
2025 tri-university narrative project points out, “The problem
with a narrative based purely on the aspiration for economic
progress, growth, and wealth is that it is necessarily subjugat-
ed in the case of an economic downturn or crisis” [12].
Europeans now express a feeling of distance from the
institution of the European Union and an inability to affect
its trajectory. While the popular voice was deemphasized in
European politics in the early years due to mutual, if subcon-
scious, agreement, the evolution of Europe and the European
mind signal the end of the “permissive consensus” [12]. A
Eurobarometer poll in Spring 2014 noted that only 31 % of
Europeans “tend to trust” the EU. Similarly, only 42 % of
Europeans believe their voice counts in the EU. Results bro-
ken down by EU member state are even more revealing (see
Fig. 1 below) [13]. In 15 of the 28 member states, over 50% of
respondents believed their voices did not count in the EU. For
those states which have borne the brunt of austerity measures,
particularly in southern Europe, the segment believing their
voices do not count reaches to 75 %.
The intuitively felt elites-masses gap was also empirically
validated by the IntUne Project. The analysis of survey data
found that in all populations and across all measured facets of
“Europeanness,” elites are more positive toward European
integration than the general population [9].
The Europe of 1950 that required elite accommodation has
evolved, through that accommodation and subsequent inte-
gration, into a Europe that presents different challenges and
requires adaptive leadership to address them. Today’s Europe
is not conducive to elite accommodation (as described by
consociationalism) as a governance scheme, and although
Europe is again deeply divided, the divisions are along differ-
ent lines, threatening new conduits for instability. Divisions of
ethnicity, religion, age, gender, socio-economic class, and
social philosophy are exacerbated by demographic decline,
education and labor shortfalls, ambivalence about immigra-
tion, the rise of populism, and disaffection with elites. The
remainder of this paper analyzes these trends in terms of their
magnitude and persistence as well as their social, economic,
and political impacts on the EU member states, highlighting
the choices the elite must make in order to successfully nav-
igate those trends and preserve the European project.
Balance of power
“Demographic change shapes political power like water
shapes rock” [14]. Though slow to be discerned, the forces
of demographic change—births, deaths, and migration—have
incredible inertia, or demographic momentum, once set in
motion. Demographic shifts can have profound implications
for global and national politics, economic growth, and ethnic,
religious, or class conflict. The size, composition, and geo-
graphical distribution of various population subgroups in re-
lation to their governments is incredibly important to voting
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patterns and the potential for cooperation or conflict on a sub-
national or international level.
When the life expectancy of a population increases (that is,
the death rate decreases) and the fertility rate stays below
replacement level, over time the number of retirees becomes
greater than the number of children entering the population.
Without sufficient immigration to offset the fertility shortfall,
the number of people leaving the population—through death,
but also through emigration—will exceed the number of those
entering, meaning the population will grow smaller over time
[15].
Demographic decline impacts a nation’s ability to project
economic and military power
& European budgets will be squeezed by population aging
and increased life expectancy since the pay-as-you-go
pension systems will have fewer workers contributing to
the support of each pensioner through tax revenue while
more people will receive pension payments and the pay-
ments will go on for more years than in earlier generations.
& The socialized medical programs in most European na-
tions, where access to healthcare is enshrined in Article 35
of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, will also
face greater expenses for health care and elderly living
arrangements [16].
& A large proportion of defense expenditures go to person-
nel costs such as pensions and benefits, and greater num-
bers of retirees will leave little for force modernization or
force projection. In addition, with sub-replacement fertil-
ity, there will be fewer young people to join the military.
What young people there are will be courted by other
employers, forcing the military to compete for talent
[17]. The German Defense Minister has recognized this
issue, launching an “Attraktivitätsoffensive,” or charm
offensive, to draw a new generation to the German mili-
tary through provisions that allow more telework, flexible
hours, and extended child care [18].
& In addition, a smaller overall workforce, which is assumed
so long as workforce participation rates do not dramati-
cally increase, can equal slower economic growth. Slower
economic growth reinforces the budget pressures on the
government and the military.
All politics are local and increasingly inter-generational
A nation’s internal distribution of power is also affected by
demographics. As urbanization empties rural towns, and im-
migrants settle in cities for greater access to services and to be
near others from their country or ethnic group, voting patterns
will change and so will representation in the halls of
government.
Not only will representation change in terms of rural versus
urban and native versus immigrant constituencies, but the
“pensioner” vote will overshadow other voting blocs. Data
from the UN indicate the elderly (65 and over) will form 41%
of the adult (20 and over) population in Italy by 2050, 38 % in
Germany, 33 % in France, and 32 % in the UK [19]. While
scholars can only speculate as to how the greater proportion of
Fig. 1 My Voice Counts in the European Union - National Results (Standard Eurobarometer 81)
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older adults in a society will affect the overall culture, it is
likely that policies will become more conservative, and it is
possible that the pensioner vote will result in decisions that
favor the current well-being of society over future growth or
stability [19]. As demographers Neil Howe and Richard Jack-
son put it, “Extremely aged societies may…prove to be dys-
functional in some ways…favoring consumption over invest-
ment, the past over the future, and the old over the young”
[19].
“Do It for Denmark” and other mitigation strategies
As awareness of demographic decline and its implications has
grown in the developed world over the past 30 years, nations
and international organizations such as the UN and the World
Economic Forum have devoted resources to studying the prob-
lem and ways to mitigate its effects. Mitigation strategies take
aim at the three components of demography (births, deaths, and
migration), offering solutions to increase fertility, reduce pen-
sion costs, increase workforce participation into old age, in-
crease immigration, and assimilate immigrants into society.
A Danish company is offering an “ovulation discount” and
3 years of baby supplies for Danes who enjoy romantic
vacations in order to conceive and thereby bolster the national
fertility rate [20]. While not the only pro-natal strategy in
Europe, it is perhaps the most creative. The decline in birth
rates is partly attributed to larger numbers of women entering
the workforce. As a result, “they have appreciable numbers of
children only in countries that enable both parents to reconcile
job and family,” according to the Berlin Institute [21]. Coun-
tries which have higher relative fertility rates, such as France
and Sweden, also have government-subsidized child care and
flexible work policies.
While labor market uncertainty brought on by the recession
has caused the total fertility rate across the EU to dip even
more dramatically, the effect is likely to be short-lived. Re-
search has shown that economic impacts on fertility are gen-
erally confined to the few years following a recession, indi-
cating postponement of child-bearing plans. Other than the
Great Depression of the 1930s, recession impacts have not
been discernible over the long term [22].
Even so, the average fertility rate in the EU is 1.5 children per
woman, well below replacement level [21]. This contributes to
the population being trimmed at both ends, causing a precipitous
drop-off in the working age population of the EU, defined as
those between ages 15 and 64, which is forecast to decline by
15 % by 2030 [23].2 Increased longevity combined with the
population bulge of the baby boom afterWorldWar II will mean
that the population of those over the age of 80will grow by 39%
by 2030 and more than double by 2080 (see Fig. 2 below) [24].
The incredible shrinking workforce
The disappearance of Europe’s workers will be the most insid-
ious threat to European security and stability over the next
several decades. Fewer workers will bear a larger burden of
social support, such as pensions, healthcare, and nursing home
care. EUROSTAT, the EU statistics agency, projects the total
age dependency ratio to rise from 51.1% in 2013, or about two
working-age people for every dependent, to 77.9 % in 2080, or
about one and a half workers for every dependent [24].3
An increased social burden could depress take-home pay
and force cuts in other government spending, which can
reduce jobs and slow down economic growth overall [25].
Lower GDP growth affects living standards, and it dispropor-
tionately affects vulnerable groups such as children and youth,
single parents, and the elderly [26]. If governments try to
avoid increasing the burden on workers by cutting pensions
and social spending on dependent groups, such actions could
still increase elder poverty and vulnerability of single-adult
households.
Pension system reform is key to the future fiscal stability of
the EU. Increasing labor participation rates, particularly for the
young and for those over 50, would lower the social burden on
the working population. Many countries are considering the
possibility of raising the pension age in order to avoid cutting
pensions, but countries which rely solely on pension age
changes to maintain their programs would have to raise the
pension age to 70+ years by 2050. Rather, policies that raise
labor participation rates by one to two percentage points by
2050 could avoid 1 year of increase in the pension age [27].
Considering the aforementioned strength of the pensioner vote,
it is likely that policies will be explored that avoid cutting
pensions and avoid dipping into healthcare funds.
Increasing labor participation, employability, and pro-
ductivity are key points in the EU’s Social Investment
Package [28]. While the package encourages Member
States to implement a number of recommendations, adop-
tion of specific policies is still up to the individual coun-
tries. Encouraging and enabling more people to enter and
stay in the workforce longer must be approached from
numerous angles, such as ensuring educational standards,
discouraging early school leaving, addressing discrimina-
tion, providing childcare, adopting flexible work arrange-
ments for parents, and offering part-time and job-sharing
options for older workers [29] (see Fig. 3 below).
2 The UN estimates the decline to be 19 % by 2050, although Goldstone
puts it closer to 25-33 % by 2050 (see reference 23).
3 The total age dependency ratio compares dependents, the number of
children under the age of 15 plus the number of people over the age of 64,
to the number of workers between those ages.
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Out of school and Out of work
Recession, austerity, and youth unemployment can exacerbate
low labor participation rates. Long-term unemployment, es-
pecially for younger workers, can have lasting effects such as
erosion of skills, permanent detachment from the labor force,
and distancing from society in general, particularly if they are
unmarried and childless. Not only will this depress economic
growth over a longer term and increase inequality, but it can
lead to societal unrest [25].
Many studies refer to a lost generation in Europe where
young people aged 15 to 24 who are not in employment,
education, or training (NEETs) make up 13 % of the
population [30]. These young people face a high risk of
marginalization, as evidence from previous crises shows
that unemployment early in one’s career can have lasting
effects on career prospects and salaries. One of the largest
groups of unemployed youth are early school-leavers
(ESLs). European Commission data shows that 54.8 %
of ESLs are unemployed, double the overall youth unem-
ployment rate in Europe [23].
This problem is highlighted in Spain where 25 % of its
young people are ESLs, the highest rate in the EU [31].
Many high school students in the 1990s left school before
graduation to make easy money in the bloated construc-
tion sector. There, they often received no further training
or skill development, and when the housing bubble burst,
thousands of young adults were out of work with no
Fig. 2 Population structure by major age groups, EU-28, 2013–80 (% of total population) (Eurostat Population Structure and Aging) [24]
Fig. 3 Population and Sex by
Age Group and Working Status,
EU-27, 2010 and 2030 (Eurostat
Population Structure and Aging)
[24]
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transferable skills. These people have less chance of find-
ing another job with every passing month, and after
2 years, they are half as likely to find a job as at the
beginning of their unemployment [32].
Due to shortfalls in educational investment over time,
Europe faces the specter of long-term structural unemploy-
ment due to skills mismatch and brain drain from countries
which have been hit the hardest economically. The need for
human capital investment, such as formal education, voca-
tional training and apprenticeships, lifelong learning, and
early childhood education, has been captured in EU strategies
such as Europe 2020 and the Social Investment Package, but
political attention has been focused on addressing the crisis
through reductions in expenditures, rather than investment in
future growth [25].
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment’s 2014 Employment Outlook encourages coun-
tries to focus greater energy and investment on job crea-
tion and stimulus in order to bring people back to work
[33]. Many companies, however, find that they must look
outside of Europe for people with the right skills to fill
vacancies. Not enough Europeans are trained in science,
engineering, technology, and math (STEM) disciplines,
while the jobs in hospitality, tourism, and even the social
sciences are becoming harder to find. Since demand for
labor has shifted from previously robust sectors to new, or
newly relevant, sectors, the unemployed must first be re-
trained before they can compete for open positions, fur-
ther delaying recovery.
Immigrants: needed but not wanted
Both internal migration and exogenous immigration could
provide needed supplements to the working-age population
in many EU member states, particularly in highly technical
sectors and in manual labor.
The right to move and reside freely throughout the Euro-
pean Union is one of the fundamental rights of its citizens, and
Europeans rate the free movement of people, goods, and
services as the most positive result of the formation of the
EU [13]. Internal labor mobility can increase the efficiency of
the market when surpluses of skills and gaps in skills avail-
ability approach equilibrium.
Brain drain through internal migration, however, can
further handicap countries already struggling to grow.
Highly educated young adults from southern tier countries
such as Spain, Italy, and Greece have left their homelands
for work in Germany, the Netherlands, or the UK. Dr.
Reiner Klingholz, the director of the Berlin Institute for
Population and Development, described the migrants from
Southern Europe to Germany as generally more qualified
than the domestic population [34]. When the southern
economies return to solvency, they will lack the skilled
workers and professionals they need to take their coun-
tries into the next age of innovation and technology.
The more visible aspect of internal migration is move-
ment from poorer countries in the east or the south to the
richer countries in the west and north. This came dramat-
ically into the public eye as the EU approached the
January 1, 2014 lifting of restrictions on citizens of Ro-
mania and Bulgaria. Though EU members since 2007,
Romanians and Bulgarians were restricted in their access
to work in the rest of the community. For months prior to
January 1, politicians across Europe called for greater
restrictions on “poverty immigrants” and “benefit tour-
ists”, believing them to be responsible for high unemploy-
ment, high taxes, an increase in crime, and an overall
feeling that the native way of life is threatened [35].
In reality, though, fewer Bulgarians and Romanians
moved for employment after January 1 than anticipated.
Data in the UK, for instance, showed that numbers were
lower in the first quarter of 2014 than they had been in the
last quarter of 2013, while year-on-year numbers showed
an increase of 28,000 workers over the previous year, still
a small percentage of the UK population [36]. The Asso-
ciation of German Cities remonstrated the German Chris-
tian Social Union in particular for inflating the gravity of
the issue, pointing out that there had only been a few
problems in parts of some major cities, and that over 50 %
of the new migrants come with good education.
Exogenous immigration, particularly illegal immigration
and asylum seeking, has grown tremendously over the last
few years. In 2013, the European border agency FRONTEX
detected 107,000 illegal border crossings, a quarter of which
were Syrians [37]. In the first 8 months of 2014, 119,839
people entered illegally through Italy alone, according to the
Italian Interior Ministry [38].
The waves of refugees and illegal immigrants fleeing
upheaval in Africa and the Middle East have set the
security of EU borders and health of EU economies
against the human rights of refugees. According to the
Dublin Regulation, asylum-seekers must remain in the
country of entry into the EU until their application has
been processed [39]. Of course, the main points of entry
are the Mediterranean countries of Greece, Italy, and
Spain which are also the hardest hit by the economic
crisis and the least capable of either policing their territory
or accommodating and processing the thousands of people
arriving on their coasts.
The largest long-term challenge with immigration,
whatever its source, is integration. Citizens in European
countries often fear that immigrants will take their jobs,
that immigrants from Muslim countries will alter the
European or national culture, and that immigrants will
drain social benefits without paying into the system,
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particularly as they are assumed to have much higher
fertility rates than natives [40].4
Poorly educated immigrants tend to pass their disadvan-
tages on to their children, making education a key area of
integration. School performance levels of second-generation
immigrant children lag far behind those of children without an
immigrant background, and children with at least one immi-
grant parent are more likely to leave school early [21, 42].
Studies have shown that early childhood education may be
key to closing the gap.
Integration is also critical in maintaining the economic
advantage of attracting highly-qualified immigrants. Due to
the openness of Europe’s borders, immigrants with sought-
after qualifications will be drawn to other countries or return to
their native countries if they are not offered more than just
jobs. Citizenship acquisition for the workers and their fami-
lies, as well as other benefits such as language instruction and
educational assistance, become important incentives to retain
talent [21].
Immigration alone, however, cannot reverse the European
aging and labor problems. While immigration can alleviate
some labor shortages, reversal of population aging and decline
in Europe would require massive inflows of migrants from
outside of the EU at “unprecedented…and unsustainable
levels” [41]. Some estimates say that it would take immigra-
tion levels of over 4 million people per year to offset Europe’s
population decline [43].
Europe’s pied pipers - the growing influence of populists
Immigrant integration, or lack thereof, is also one of the
platforms of the populist parties rising around Europe. Not
only do many Europeans believe immigrants to be an eco-
nomic burden on their economies, but they find them to be a
challenge to their cultures [44]. As Oxford University demog-
rapher David Coleman writes, “Differences in expectations
and values have challenged the receiving societies’ politics,
constitutions, schools, and community relations, especially
when the robust traditional values of the newcomers encoun-
ter a weakened sense of identity on the part of the Europeans”
[45].
Factions within several EU nations are advocating quotas
on immigrants and even suspension of the Schengen Agree-
ment. These voices gained ground when Switzerland voted in
February 2014 to limit the number of immigrants it will accept
from the EU. European leaders, including former European
Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, were quick to
defend the principle of free movement throughout the com-
munity, but the euro-sceptic, or populist, parties that had been
gaining strength in many EU countries took the Swiss vote as
a sign that their message would resonate with voters [35].
Results from the May 2014 European Parliament elections
show that the populists were effective in their campaigns
against the EU, the euro, and immigration. France’s Front
National and England’s UK Independence Party (UKIP)
won nearly a quarter of the vote in their elections. In Austria,
Denmark, Sweden, and Hungary other far-right parties also
did well, including the Greek xenophobic and neo-Nazi Gold-
en Dawn Party which won seats in the European Parliament
for the first time.
Euroscepticism is not the sole domain of the right, howev-
er. In Finland, for instance, the centrists tend to be most
Eurosceptic, but elsewhere the anti-EU Left is seeing great
gains. In Greece, the leftist Syriza rode a wave of anti-austerity
sentiment to victory, and its leader Alexis Tsipras is using his
star power to promote his kindred spirits in Spain. The
Podemos party was established in Spain in January 2014,
and by the time of the European Parliament elections in
May, it was popular enough to garner 8 % of the vote.
Although its leader, politics professor Pablo Iglesias, dis-
avows the “leftist” descriptor, saying the struggle is between
the above and below, Podemos’s party platform includes
instituting the 35-hour work week, lowering the retirement
age to 60, and preventing profitable companies from firing
workers [46].5
While these parties, collectively referred to as “populist”,
vary widely in their ideologies and platforms, they generally
appeal to the growing distrust many Europeans have for
government in general, and the EU institutions in particular.6
Since the economic crisis began in 2008 and the EU imposed
austerity measures to bring national debts back in line with EU
rules, many Europeans are not enjoying the fruits of integra-
tion that they were promised by their national leaders. For
many in the southern tier, and for those with less education
and fewer advantages, life is decidedly more difficult than it
ever was before their nations joined the EU and the euro.
It is easy for the rabble-rousing parties to prey on discon-
tent, fear, and lack of understanding of the complicated EU
processes to turn people against the EU as a whole, their
national leaders, and against anyone who is different and
who may be seen as taking part of the pie to which they4 In truth, immigrants from outside of the EU do often have higher
fertility rates than European natives, but immigrants only account for a
small fraction of the overall population. Immigrant fertility also steeply
declines in the second generation as the community acculturates [41].
These cultural differences in fertility are largely due to the varying points
in the Demographic Transition Model occupied by the sending country
and the receiving country, although religious norms do account for some
of the social differences not encompassed by the model.
5 All of these policies, of course, would exacerbate the issues of demo-
graphic decline and labor shortfalls, as discussed in the previous sections.
6 Aworking definition of populism describes adherents as militantly anti-
elite, glorifying the “common people,” and xenophobic, that is, afraid of
the “other,” not necessarily racist or anti-immigrant, although those are
common attributes [47].
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believe they should have exclusive rights. These voters are
generally not committed supporters of a populist party, but
they make up the majority of the parties’ electoral support.
Research has shown that the profile of these voters changes
from country to country, but the overall commonality, more
than age, gender, or unemployment, is a lower level of edu-
cation [47]. Early-school leavers, also one of the largest por-
tions of unemployed youth in Europe, may be especially
receptive to populist messaging [23], and the lack of invest-
ment in education across Europe is directly contributing to the
electoral prospects of populists.
The populist parties gaining ground in Europe are by
varying degrees violent, anti-Semitic, Islamophobic, xeno-
phobic, sexist, anti-democratic, extremist, and racist. At the
least, the parties participating in the European Parliament will
be disruptive, but at worst, their presence will be detrimental
to the unity of effort European leaders will need to address the
growing challenges the continent faces over the next thirty to
50 years. Thoughminorities in the European Parliament, these
parties will claim to bring the voices of the populace into the
halls of the elite, challenging the legislative and administrative
processes that have purportedly strayed so far from the orig-
inal European promise.
The multi-level conundrum
Those bureaucratic processes and the bevy of staff necessary
to support them have become targets of anti-EU rhetoric, but
they are only part of the game. European leadership play
multi-level games: at the EU level between EU institutions
and member states, among political parties at the EU Parlia-
ment level, between member states, and at the national level
between member state leadership and their constituencies.
Understanding these games and the complexity entailed in
such multi-level governance is key to the elites’ ability to
recast the mechanism of EU integration and cooperation from
consociational democracy to a model that can respond to
modern demands for participation in government. Political
scientist Robert Putnam’s 1988 article proposed a theory of
two-level games in international negotiations [48]. In his
theory, a leader in international negotiations sits at two game
boards simultaneously. His actions on one board
(international) directly affect his options on the other (domes-
tic). In order to succeed in both games, he must make an
agreement at the international level that can be ratified at the
domestic level. Any agreement, therefore, must fall within the
set of outcomes acceptable to the domestic constituency; this
is called the win-set [48].
The rise in popular disaffection with the EU elites and the
success of populist parties who are co-opting that sentiment to
draw political discourse further from the center toward the
right and left extremes decrease the sizes of the win-sets for
leaders at the member state and EU levels. It is this point that
democratic EU leaders must address if they are to successfully
compete at each game board. Gone are the days when EU
bureaucrats could stay in Brussels and deal only with other
legislators and national officials. EU politicians must actively
expand their win-sets from the municipal and regional levels,
addressing the concerns and engaging the energies of their
constituencies.
A european kairos—a moment of opportunity
Europe’s leaders have a limited window, quite possibly as
narrow as the next two to 5 years, in which to effect changes
in perceptions and processes that will set the trajectory for the
coming decades. The trends discussed in this paper—demo-
graphic decline, a shrinking and mis-educated workforce, the
need for immigration but antipathy toward immigrants, and
the toxicity of populist rhetoric—have the potential to coa-
lesce and compound, creating faults in the union that can
become unstable with little warning.
Extrapolating current conditions and trends, Europe could
be fragmented and fractious in 15 years. The population over
the age of 64 will be 31 % larger than it is today while the
population under the age of 15 will be 4 % smaller. The
workforce participation rates will remain largely unchanged,
but the overall drop in the working-age population will affect
the total age dependency ratio, squeezing national budgets for
social services.
At the same time that money is tight in European capitals,
the feeling of peace and relative security will have long
evaporated, giving way to a new brinkmanship with Russia,
a feeling of economic inadequacy in relation to China, out-
right hostility from Turkey, and an unseen but constant cloud
of threat from extremists of all flavors.With their governments
unable to provide either prosperity or security, European
publics will become more insular and conservative, rejecting
further European integration or calls for intervention in for-
eign conflicts, as well as hardening anti-immigration posi-
tions, even to the point of suspending the Schengen Agree-
ment. Such insulation will further slow economic growth and
drive innovation out of the continent.
It could be much worse, however, if euro-sceptic parties
gain power in one or more of the larger EU nations. If UKIP
gains the majority, it will pull Britain out of the EU, creating
trade barriers and eliminating freemovement. This will impact
the tourism industry, as well as areas such as agriculture which
depend on seasonal workers from Poland to bring in crops. If
the Front National wins in Paris, it will also attempt to leave
the EU, and its isolationist, protectionist, and anti-immigrant
policies will stifle economic growth. Without severely
curtailing the social compact, the country could face bank-
ruptcy, and if they do reel in social spending, widespread
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unrest will undoubtedly result. If Podemos were to pull
enough votes away from the Partido Popular (PP) and the
Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE) to gain power in
Spain, its pledge to write off national debt and lower labor
participation rates (purportedly to increase employment over-
all) would lead to EU sanctions, bank runs, and skyrocketing
unemployment and emigration. Regardless of national spe-
cifics, the EU is likely to fracture, and the continent will revert
to isolationist and nationalist enclaves primed for conflict over
the social and economic privations they face.
In the best-case scenario, Europe in 15 years is
governed by an elite that, having recognized that their
emotional attachment to the European project was not
shared at the national level, engaged their publics, partic-
ularly those who were not normally politically active and
who felt left out of the fruits of being European. Euro-
peans of all economic classes participate in policy forma-
tion through increased direct representation. Having
invested in education and innovation, as well as loosening
monetary policy to encourage growth, the European econ-
omy has stabilized to the point that governments have
been able to implement the structural reforms needed to
avoid another crisis. European militaries are tech-savvy
and lean, deploying to trouble spots around the world in
security and stability operations.
Most people now say they feel more European than
they used to, many having taken part in intra-European
mobility programs for study and work. Since there are
sensible and coordinated work flexibility and childcare
programs across the EU, people have begun to have more
children, re-entering the workforce afterward. Such flexi-
bility also benefits older workers who stay in the labor
force longer, drawing half-pension. EU nations actively
recruit educated workers from outside of the EU and
provide a support system including language and culture
training for their families to assist in integration. All EU
nations share the economic and physical burdens of pro-
cessing illegal immigrants, implementing coordinated in-
tegration programs to ensure as many as possible become
productive members of their new societies.
These futures are plausible, but they certainly do not
contain every possible permutation. What is certain,
though, is that while many on both sides of the Atlantic
believe Europe to be a mature exporter of security and
participant in building global peace and prosperity, leav-
ing current trends unimpeded could again bring conflict to
the European continent and make it a consumer of secu-
rity, stretching the capabilities of allies who are already
heavily engaged elsewhere in the world. Europeans have
an opportune moment to avoid that outcome, and the key
is to address the long-term and complex issues which will
determine the shape and substance of the future European
society.
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